This paper tests the overreaction hypothesis of capital flows to emerging markets. Using excessive capital flows episodes and other of deep contractions we found that a surge in capital flows or a capital boom can predict to sharp contractions or sudden stops. We use a large list of possible economic fundamentals as control variables and the result show the best predictor of a sudden stop is a year of capital boom. When the capital boom episode is longer than one year the probability of suffering a sudden stop the next year is higher. These results are interesting because of the much known negative real effects of sudden stops and they are opposite to other studies that emphasize the worsening of a particular economic variable. JEL Classification: F30, F32, F39.
Introduction
Informal claims on overreaction in financial markets seem arise more frequently than they are admitted by economists and analysts. The latter feel more comfortable to anchor stock prices movements to informed expectations on future fundamentals.
However, in a seminal work De Bondt and Thaler (1985) evaluated the overreaction in the stock market and proved that, as occurs in many other human activities, financial markets showed an excessive reaction to new information or unexpected events. One of the main conclusions of De Bondt and Thaler was that the pronounced reversion in prices (negative returns) could be predictable according to the observation of extreme previous positive returns, that is, the upward overreaction subsequently calls for a dramatic adjustment.
An important detail is what literature identifies as overreaction. This identification is
related to psychological factors that push the price far from what would be determined by fundamental factors. Consequently, examples of markets with frequent overreaction behaviour are those showing excess of volatility. Such is the case of capital flows to emerging markets, where an unexplained volatility has been found. In a very illustrative paper, Broner and Rigobon (2006) showed that capital flows to emerging markets are more volatile than those to developed countries. Using GDP per capita, inflation rates, real depreciation of exchange rates, terms of trade and interest rates from a set of emerging countries, the standard deviation of the error from panel estimations was greater than the error from a panel using data for developed countries in more than 60%. This standard deviation was deeply reduced using own lags of capital flows and contagion variables.
Our approach is different. We focus in the predictive power of capital flows bonanza on subsequent and sharp reversions of capital flows, also named sudden stops, as an overreaction display. We define episodes of large capital flows that we call capital boom to emerging markets those that are largely unusual as determined by a standard deviation over the historical mean and are at least a five percentage of GDP. Based on a paper of Guidotti et al. (2004) we define periods of abrupt reversions or sudden stops in a very close way. Similarly to the findings in stock prices, our results indicate that a capital boom period predicts a latter sudden stop. If the capital boom is longer, the probability of a sudden stop will be greater.
In our approach, emerging markets should be seen as an asset class for financial markets. 1 This view has been confirmed by Leijonhufvud (2007) indicating that financial institutions have separate business units that manage profit and loss targets for their investments to emerging markets. Leijonhufvud stresses this organizational construct to accuse the financial markets to be responsible for the risk concentration in emerging markets and the consequent formation of bubbles in asset prices. In addition, managers and employees at financial institutions have compensation systems "which link annual bonus payments to the amount of net income an employee has generated for the firm or its clients in a given year directly encourage employees to focus on shortterm income opportunities" (Leijonhufvud, 2007) . To strengthen these ideas a test performed by Kamisnky et al. (2004) using monthly and quarterly data proved the existence of chartist strategies (buy winners and sell losers) and contagion trading in mutual funds dedicated to Latin America. These strategies were proved stronger during crises.
In this paper we use the financial account of balance of payments as capital flows and through a multivariate analysis of the probability of suffering a sudden stop we test the relevance of the prior capital boom. A capital boom year is a period dominated by short run chartist strategies as described previously and the probability found of carrying on a capital boom the next year is significant and very similar to the probability of suffering a sudden stop. However, as the capital boom is longer greater will be the probability of a consequent sudden stop and the probability of a capital boom will vanish.
In contrast to other studies such as Edwards (2007), Calvo at al. (2004) or Cavallo and Frankel (2004) , who attributed domestic variables the cause of sudden stops, our results point to these episodes (some times a case of downward overreaction) are sharp adjustments to prior upward overreaction periods. But it does not mean that fundamentals are unimportant to prevent a sudden stop episode. As a matter of fact, large capital flows can deteriorate some macroeconomic variables such as the current account deficit, the consequent deep appreciation of the real exchange rate, the excessive private debt to bank sector, or the mismatch of the balance sheet of firms and banks that receive flows in foreign money and that can trigger a massive withdrawal.
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However, many of these variables are not robust in its predictive power which tempts us to think large capital flows are the best indicator of this worsening in the recipient economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section shows the definitions of boom and sudden stop episodes. Section 3 describes the methodological analysis. Section 4 and Section 5 present our main results and some robustness exercises respectively. Finally, Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
Definition of Boom and Sudden Stop Periods
We use annual data for 42 emerging economies in the period 1976 -2003. We chose that period trying to cover the most known crises in a number of countries which might lead to obtain consistent estimators based on the asymptotic theory of panels. The complete list of countries is shown in the Appendix
Boom Episodes:
We define a year of capital boom when the financial account of the balance of payments is a standard deviation above its mean and is at least 5% of the GDP. Thus, there is a capital boom in the year t when F it = 1 according to the following rule:
(1) 0 otherwise where F it is the value of the financial account of country i in year t (current US dollars deflated by the US consumer price index), i F is its mean for the entire period and i F σ is its standard deviation. By using as our definition of capital boom requiring that the capital flows are one standard deviation above the mean we assure the unusual character of this episode. The normalization by GDP is a way to show a big deviation of one of the most important fundamentals. We prefer to use the level of capital flows rather than the annual change because the latter could give the idea of sudden increases, however, our objective is to get not only big increases but high inflows received by the economies. In the period 1976-2003 for the 42 countries in our sample we observe 152 capital booms, a 13% of the sample. In the Appendix we show the list of these episodes.
Sudden Stop Episodes:
Following Guidotti et al. (2004), we identify a sudden stop of capital flows when the annual change in the financial account is one standard deviation below its mean and is 5% above the GDP, measured in absolute value. Concretely, a country will suffer a sudden stop when SS it = 1 according to the following rule: σ is its standard deviation. In the case of sudden stops, we are interested not in the absolute value of capital flows but in a significant decline from the preceding year. Again, as with capital booms, the joint condition applied to classify an event as a sudden stop works complementarily. Thus, countries with little volatility in capital flows can have episodes where a standard deviation below the mean implies a minor contraction, however, to fix a share of GDP guarantees a larger contraction. Since our interest is to identify the start of a contraction in capital inflow, whenever a sudden stop in a particular year is followed by another sudden stop the following year, only the first contraction will be considered to be a sudden stop. As noted in definition (2), we discard episodes which are both sudden stops and capital booms, as per definition (1).
In our sample, we found 74 episodes that qualify for sudden stops, a 7% of the sample.
The annual distribution of sudden stops is shown in the Appendix.
A view of these episodes can be seen in Figure 1 . The horizontal line is placed a standard deviation above the mean for each country. The shadowed region shows the drop in capital flows that corresponds to a sudden stop. Sudden stops look as sharp adjustments after periods of consecutive booms.
[Insert Figure 1 ] In Table 1 we show the average contraction of capital flows as a share of GDP occurring two years after a period of three years of capital boom. This contraction is always higher than after three-year period of positive capital inflows in tranquil periods 3 and significantly different for all the geographical regions considered with the exception of Europe. Another relevant characteristic is that the average growth rate of GDP after two years of this large period of capital boom is less (and even sometimes negative) than after two years from those episodes of positive capital inflows. Again, this difference is significant unlike Europe. This negative effect of capital booms has renewed interest in these episodes as is noticed in a recent paper of Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) .
[Insert Table 1 ] 
Multivariate Probit Analysis
Being Φ the standard normal distribution, we estimate a panel probit with heterogeneous unobserved effects. For the boom episodes we estimate the following equation:
where ContFF is a binary contagion variable taking value 1 when the number of boom episodes in a particular year and the year before in other countries of the sample exceeds twice the average annual number of booms. NonFDI is the share of GDP that represents the type of capital flows different to FDI in the financial account, X is a matrix of control variables and c is the unobserved country specific effect.
The FF lagged one period describes the feedback effect in euphoric phases. According to Kindleberger (2005) the psychology of investors strengthens these periods of bonanza because of the knowledge of large financial investments in some emerging country done for the rest of participants in the international financial markets that attracts more investments and build overconfidence in these strategies day by day, month by month or year by year. This variable is a way to consider the chartist strategies that are used for institutions when the capital flows are high. The inclusion of NonFDI variable makes sense with our theoretical support because this kind of flows generally has a shorter horizon than FDI and is susceptible to be checked more frequently according to the new information received.
As can be seen in Figure 2 , non-FDI flows show an increasing trend in previous years of sudden stops and drop sharply during these events.
[Insert Figure 2]
Matrix X includes variables that could be interpreted as capital flows determinants.
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These are the GDP growth (GDP), the change in terms of trade (TT), the ratio of external debt to exports (ED/X), and the current account deficit as a share of GDP (CAD), all of them as measures of economic solvency although CAD works as a proxy of capital flows as will be seen in the results section. Other variables included refer to domestic or external conditions. The real foreign interest rate (Rf) and the rate of growth of G7 countries (G7gdp) are presented as external variables and the real domestic interest rate (Rd) and the fiscal surplus (Gov_Def) 6 as domestic ones.
We follow a similar strategy to estimate the probability of suffering a sudden stop:
4 It is consistent with findings of Levchenko and Mauro (2006) who decomposed the flows around sudden stops and showed that the most volatile are non-FDI flows. 
This time the FF lagged describes the euphoria effect on the sudden stop as an overreaction period that needs to be corrected. Eventually a large period of bonanza is not going to persist much time. In a financial market with many heterogeneous agents some of them are aware of the high levels of capital flows with no correspondence to economic fundamentals or investment decisions using only information from other investors, new information or new investors can arrive both provoking a sharp adjustment. These periods are typically dominated by non-FDI flows as it was shown in Figure 2 . Similarly to equation (3) ContSS is a binary variable taking value 1 when the number of sudden stops in a particular year and the year before in other countries of the sample exceeds twice the average annual number of sudden stops. 7 This contagion can rise the probability of suffering a sudden stop as will be showed in the next section.
In matrix X there are variables that have been used in the literature on balance of payment crises and determinants of sudden stops. The most used variable is CAD 8 .
Furthermore, we use an indicator of banking crises (bankcrises) with data from Caprio and Kinglebiel (2003) and other of exchange rate rigidity from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) in order to test the assumption that if a country has a more rigid regime of exchange rate it is more prone to suffer a sudden stop. Problems to pay external debt have been present in many of the most known crises so we considered including the external debt to exports ratio (ED/X). Other variables found significant in other studies are liability dollarization (dollarization) and economic openness (openness).
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In addition, in some specifications we use the real exchange rate depreciation (RER), the ratio of M2 to GDP (M2/GDP), the change in terms of trade (TT) and the change of reserves (Reserves) to control for a possible signal that can activate the stampede of investors. External (Rf, G7gr) and domestic variables (Rd, Gov_Def) are used too.
To estimate (3) and (4) [ ]
where for notational simplicity we have suppressed both cross and time units, y indicates the endogenous variable (FF or SS) and X collect all variables in the right hand side of (3) and (4). c has a conditional distribution
However, additional assumptions are needed since the lagged dependent variable in equation (3) becomes it in a dynamic panel. In order to report consistent estimators we can not use a first difference of the dependent variable as is very popular in linear models because the standard normal distribution is a highly nonlinear function. We follow Wooldridge (2000 and 2002) and propose a distribution for c i of the following way: Table 2 shows the results for the estimation of equation (3). In column (1) all the variables employed are at least 5% significant presenting the expected signs. Our variable capital boom lagged is very significant and shows the highest marginal effect.
Main Results
If the previous year the economy was undergoing a boom episode the probability that this boom persists the next year increases a 13%. This result makes sense with the feedback forces of the Kindleberger model and the strategies and transmission mechanisms explained in the behavioral finance literature 10 .
Contagion from other countries is another relevant variable. This increases the probability of a boom episode in 6%. Furthermore, large non-FDI flows, a high growth rate of GDP and a positive shock of terms of trade augment the probability of a capital boom episode the next year although their marginal effects are small. The external debt to exports ratio emerges as an important variable to discourage boom periods and unexpectedly the current account deficit has a positive sign. This result seems to indicate that the current account deficit works as a proxy for capital flows to the country.
In column (2) of Table 2 we aggregate external and domestic variables. A fall in external interest rate and in the growth rate of G7 countries increase the probability of a capital boom, as are expected, whereas widen fiscal deficits reduce it. Terms of trade and non-FDI flows are not robust to the inclusion of new relevant variables.
[Insert Table 2 ] Table 3 shows the results for the estimation of equation (4). We progressively include variables in columns and exclude others to avoid inference problems from irrelevant variables. Capital boom in a previous period has a predictive power on a sudden stop and its effect is the highest (increases the probability of a sudden stop around 9%) and is robust to the inclusion of other variables. This result is interesting because is achieved conditioning to the action of other variables or fundamentals that can be affected by the bonanza of capital flows, therefore widening the hypothesis of adjustments caused by a previous upward overreaction period to the capital flows to emerging markets. Other variables resulting significant and robust are: contagion, non-FDI flows, current account deficit and external debt to exports ratio. The international contagion is very important to raise the probability of suffering a sudden stop; its marginal effect is around 3%. All significant variables show the expected signs.
[Insert Table 3 ]
Longer capital boom period
In the case of the probability of a capital boom, it does not rise significantly if the prior period of bonanza is extended for more than one year 11 , however the probability of suffering a sudden stop increases significantly. Table 4 shows the marginal effects for similar specifications as in Table 3 widening boom periods in each column. Thus, column (1) considers a two-year boom period according to equation (1), column (2) a three-year boom period and the column (3) a four-year boom period. Results go to support the increasing importance of a longer capital boom period to predict a sudden stop episode raising the probability to 27% when boom endure 4 years.
[Insert Table 4] 11 We do not report these results. Available on request.
Sub-sample 1990-2003
As can be seen in the Appendix years after 1982 were absent of large capital inflows in the emerging world until 1991 when a new wave of financial flows arrived mainly to Asia, Mexico and South America. These countries have shown to be more open to international financial markets. [Insert Table 5] The probit estimations for capital boom episodes show domestic variables to increase their probability are GDP and CAD only. On the other hand, results for sudden stop determinants confirm the evidence of Table 4 . As the boom period lengthens greater is the probability of suffering a sudden stop. Other important result is the larger effect of contagion in relation to the complete sample during sudden stop episodes. These countries seem to be more related among them than to other countries so that the occurrence of sudden contractions of capital flows in these countries rises the probability of suffering a sudden stop since a 3% in Table 4 to 6% -15% levels in Table   5 .
Some Robustness Tests
In order to test the robustness of the results we change the threshold of 5% of GDP in equations (1) and (2). A 3% and 7% threshold is used to prove the results to the change of this condition. Furthermore, as can be seen in Tables 6 and 7 Finally, Table 7 shows an additional definition for sudden stops. We name this definition SSgdp and it requires in addition to equation (2), a fall in GDP during the year of the sudden stop or a year later. SSgdp collects the episodes with a large effect in real sector, which is one of the main reasons for the increasing interest in academics and policy makers in sudden stops. Table 6 reports the marginal effects of probit estimations for capital boom episodes.
The effect of a prior capital boom is similar to that showed in Table 2 and very significant therefore the conclusions about the sources of a capital boom still hold.
Some variables such as Rf, G7gdp and Rd are not relevant when we define a more extreme capital boom episode unlike the fiscal surplus, Gov_Def, that become significant only in that case. Contagion and nonFDI flows seem not to be relevant in extreme episodes of boom but they do are relevant when we use only gross flows. The gross flows to an emerging country seem to be dominated by external factors such as the international financial markets and the performance of the most industrialized countries as can be seen in the last column of Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 ] Table 7 shows that our main variables are still significant using different definitions of sudden stops, supporting our conclusions described in the previous section. The prior boom of capital flows and its composition are very important to predict a sudden stop.
International contagion helps to account for a sudden stop episode although it loose its relevance when a more extreme fall is required or gross flows are used instead of net flows. The domestic variable that is important in every case is CAD supporting previous studies in the literature. 12 New variables appear to be significant in a sudden stop with a sharper fall such as dollarization, the change in reserves and exchange rate regime. With the exception of the exchange rate regime all show the expected sign.
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The capital boom, international contagion and increasing nonFDI flows are robust to predict a sudden stop with negative real effects on GDP growth, SSgdp. An increase in external debt to exports ratio and not just in the current account deficit are domestic signals that could generate a reversion in capital flows. In one run the dollarization and the rise of the foreign real interest rate will show to be significant to increase the probability of SSgdp. Unexpectedly, rises in domestic real interest rates have a positive effect instead of stopping the stampede of capital flows as was expected. The latter may be due to an increase of interest rate is taken as a tightening of credit conditions for the domestic debtors.
[Insert Table 7] The effect of an extended capital boom period is stronger on SSgdp than on SS as can be seen in Table 8 when it achieve a 35% of marginal effect on the probability of a SSgdp.
[Insert Table 8] Other robustness proof is based on the creation of early warning signals to crisis period as in Kaminsky et al. (1998) . It could seem that the creation of the capital boom indicator works as a signal and strengthens its importance in the probit estimations compared to other explanatory variables that are measured in a continuous way. For this reason we use the current account deficit, which is the most successful domestic variable in previous estimations, and create a signal in the same way as a capital boom 13 The negative sign in TC in Table 7 indicates that a more rigid regime reduces the probability of suffering an extreme sudden stop which is an opposite result to the consensual view. However, this can be a fuzzy result because we use the 1-5 classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2005) where although floating regime (2 in classification) has the fewer episodes of sudden stops this number is not very different from other regimes and even the most of sudden stops does not occur in a 5 regime (fix).
according to equation (1) named S1CAD. On the other hand, we create other indicator based on the percentile of the current account deficit that minimizes the noise-signal ratio, as is calculated in Kaminsky et al. (1998) . This optimal threshold is 5%, that is, the 5% of the largest current account deficits minimize this noise-signal ratio. 14 We name this variable S2CAD. Tables 9 and 10 show results of probit estimations including both indicators of the current account deficit. We use three definitions of sudden stop: SS, SSgdp and SSgross. Tables 9 and 10 indicate that to include these indicators do not add relevant information to the has already been declared by capital boom, contagion, nonFDI flows, current account deficit as a share of GDP measured in a continuous way and the external debt to exports ratio. In some cases when both indicators replace the current account variable they show significant marginal effects but they are less than the effect from capital boom variable.
[Insert Table 9] [Insert Table 10] Finally, we use the two-step procedure of Rivers and Vuong (1988) We do not show these results but they are available on request.
Concluding Remarks
Many studies have been looking for what is the variable or variables that trigger a deep withdrawal of capital flows to emerging markets. The current account deficit, the dollarization of liabilities or the excessive banking credit are some of the most dealt with in recent literature. However, sudden stops have not been seen as a consequence of a previous period of overreaction self-created in the international financial markets.
A capital boom is a display of upward overreaction and overexposes to capital flows to sharp and sudden contractions. This means that many times it does not necessary has a fundamental which is the source of the reversion of positive expectations, it can be a minor rumor that disheartens the apparent optimism in a particular country or international contagion that does not have any relation with the domestic conditions.
Recent studies of the behavioral in financial markets and herd behavior demonstrate periods of overoptimism are fragile and can be sudden finished facing new information.
Our application to capital flows to emerging markets confirms the overreaction hypothesis and its predictive power. Using other arguments of behavioral finance we can explain that loss aversion in investors and financial institutions with stop loss orders and margin calls makes the reversion process sharper and shorter than previous bonanza. Unambiguously, if the receipt country has a deteriorated profile the reversion has a high probability to be more extreme.
Finally, as policy recommendation we have to say emerging countries having a future agenda to integrate themselves into international financial markets should take into account the self-created volatility of these and primarily the self-created euphoria. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% FF t-1 and FF t-2 7.0*** -9.3*** FF t-1 -FF t-3 11.6*** -18.9*** FF t-1 -FF t-4 14.5* -26.7* CONTSS 2.1* -2.9** 2.4* -2.8** 2.5** -2.9** NFDI t-1 0.6*** -0.8*** 0.7*** -0.8*** 0.7** -0.8*** CAD t-1 0.3** -0.5*** 0.3* -0.5*** 0.3** -0.5*** ED/X t-1 0.7* -0.8* 
SSgdp
FF t-1 10.5*** -12.9*** 5.2*** -7.5*** 11.7*** -14.8*** 5.1*** -6.2*** CONTSS 3.1** -4.0*** 1.6* -2.6*** a Indicators of sudden stop, capital boom and contagion are created using gross flows only. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% FF t-1 y FF t-2 5.5*** -9.4*** FF t-1 -FF t-3 8.0*** -18.9*** FF t-1 -FF t-4 20.1*** -34.5*** CONTSS 1.6* -2.3** 1.6* -2.7** 1.6* -2.5*** NF t-1 0.2***-0.3*** 0.3*** -0.7*** 2.8** -3.2** CAD t-1 0.2* -0.3*** 0.2** -0.4** 0.2* -0.4** ED/X t-1 0.5* -0.8** 0.6** -0.7*** 0.5** -0.6* Rd t-1 0.0** a Indicators of sudden stop, capital boom, contagion and nonFDI flows are created using gross flows only. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% a Indicators of sudden stop, capital boom, contagion and nonFDI flows are created using gross flows only. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
